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For corporations today, the importance of reputation and standing for something beyond the 
functional benefits or price point of a product or service has never been more important in the 
battle for consumer loyalty and trust.
—Fred Cook, President and CEO of GollinHarris (GollinHarris, 2004)
The increased requirements firms face for corporate citizenship reflected in the above 
quotation have occurred because of an evolution of society’s expectations of the legitimate 
business firm (Sharfman, 1994). Regardless of whether Rousseau’s (1762/1968) concept of 
the social contract is a valid theory of firm social responsibility, society increasingly accepts 
it as how businesses should address social issues (Donaldson, 1982). Although the trend has 
been building for a long time, firms facing increasing pressures from society and its key 
institutions to be more legitimate (i.e., better corporate citizens) often answer that pressure 
by performing more of what they judge to be expected corporate social performance (CSP). 
For many firms, the changing expectations create difficulties because they receive conflict-
ing information from institutional actors about their “debt.” What is appropriate (even 
essential) social performance for one constituency is heresy to others (e.g., Rupp, Williams 
& Aguilera, in press). Furthermore, it is not clear to managers why firms even in the same 
industry seem subject to different pressures for social performance.
We propose that the differing legitimacy requirements and CSP expectations firms face stem 
in part from the degree of attention they attract from society. Managers gauge (either implicitly 
or explicitly) the amount of legitimacy pressure this attention creates and then make instrumen-
tal choices about how much CSP to perform in response. Although the majority of CSP studies 
have posited it as a manifestation of intrafirm phenomena such as managerial values, CEO 
compensation, or board structure (e.g., Buchholtz, Amason, & Rutherford,1999; Deckop, Mer-
riman, & Gupta, 2006; Logsdon & Yuthas, 1997; Wang & Coffey, 1992), a growing group of 
authors (e.g., Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007; J. L. Campbell, 2007; Cox, Bram-
mer, & Millington, 2004; David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2008; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Matten 
& Moon, 2008; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Neubaum & Zahra, 2006; Rupp, Ganapathi, Agu-
ilera, & Williams, 2006; Weaver, Trevino, & Cochran, 1999) propose that CSP is as much a 
response to external pressures as it is to internal characteristics or managerial values. For exam-
ple, using a multilevel theoretical framework, Aguilera et al. (2007) suggest that organizations 
are pressured to engage in corporate social activities based on both instrumental and noninstru-
mental motives whereas Rupp et al. (in press) suggest that CSP decisions are made as a function 
of “the extent to which the decisions are self-determined, i.e., that the acts are seen as either 
externally valuable or intrinsically rewarding” (p. 10). Additionally, McWilliams and Siegel 
(2001) argue that firms perform CSP based on the demand for CSP from stakeholders to achieve 
optimal economic efficiency. Our research builds on these ideas using an institutional theoreti-
cal framework and tests a model of factors that predicts how social performance will vary 
among firms due to the visibility they attract.
Because firms identify the legitimacy constraints placed on them by society or its institu-
tions and in part use CSP to meet those demands (e.g., Matten & Moon, 2008), it is necessary 
to detail this relationship more precisely. The relationship between legitimacy and CSP can 
be summarized in the following points: (a) business firms are recognizing (or being forced to 
by stakeholders) that CSP is not a luxury or a nicety, but an important provider of legitimacy 
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and by implication of reputation (Rao, 1994); (b) legitimization is society’s permission for 
the firm to do business, in effect its “license to operate” (e.g., Dow, 2002). Therefore legiti-
macy is an essential input to the firm (Wood, 1991a) and an important intangible resource (cf. 
Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Hall, 1993; Itami & Roehl, 1987); (c) American society specifi-
cally and global society generally are increasing their expectations (demands) for the “fees” 
for this legitimacy-based license to operate, that is, more CSP (e.g., GollinHarris, 2004). In 
other words, providing sufficient benefits to the society in which it operates has become criti-
cal for a firm to legitimize its existence and ensure its future.
However, firms that are more in the public eye are more likely to face these legitimacy 
pressures than firms the public does not know (e.g., Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Therefore this 
demand for more CSP likely would not be uniform across industries or across firms within 
industries because firms and industries vary in the amount of attention they attract (e.g., J. 
L. Campbell, 2007). For example, when was the last time we saw a firm in the metal cutting 
industries marketed their public image, yet highly visible energy companies do so all the 
time. From these disparities our research questions arose:
Research Question 1: What effects do legitimacy pressure and legitimacy-seeking behavior have 
on a firm’s CSP?
Research Question 2: Can CSP be conceptualized as an instrumental response to legitimacy pres-
sure based in part on the firm’s visibility?
Research Question 3: What is the role of financial performance in the relationship between a firm’s 
visibility and its CSP?
To address these questions, we examine the effects of three different types of direct or 
indirect sources of visibility—industry visibility, visibility to multiple stakeholders, and 
financial resources visibility—on a firm’s CSP. Higher visibility motivates managers to 
perform more socially responsible activities because they are under greater scrutiny by the 
firm’s stakeholders and society to be better corporate citizens. In addition, we investigate 
whether the relationship between firm visibility and CSP is affected by different levels of 
financial performance. Because the results of prior empirical studies on the relationship 
between firm financial performance and firm CSP (e.g., Aupperle, Carroll, & Hatfield, 
1985; Orlitzky, 2001; Waddock & Graves, 1997) have been inconsistent, we use a different 
approach to investigate this linkage.
The objective of this study is to examine industry- and firm-level characteristics that lead 
to greater visibility, which in turn lead firms to respond to legitimacy demands with different 
levels of CSP. Our approach allows for an investigation of CSP in a unique way. If managers 
assess their firm’s legitimacy expectations to determine the extent to which to engage in CSP, 
CSP becomes an instrumental choice and a resource—one that can be used by the firm for its 
own strategic ends (Barney, 1991). In spite of the instrumental nature of the argument, it 
should be noted that this model does not preclude ethically motivated CSP. Evidence sug-
gests that managers sometimes engage in CSP strictly as a function of their own values as 
opposed to having a more instrumental motivation (e.g., Miles, 1987).
The primary contribution from this research is it takes a step further in disentangling the 
complex relationships among stakeholders’ pressures, financial performance, and their 
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effects on CSP. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study examining how managers 
might be motivated to engage in socially responsible activities in response to societal expec-
tations and legitimacy pressures that come from higher visibility. That is, motivations other 
than normative/ethical ones may be at play in the CSP decisions that firms make. This 
research contributes to the CSP literature by extending our understanding of instrumental 
motives of managers in performing socially responsive actions. In addition, by incorporat-
ing both industry and firm level variables in the model, this research provides a more 
sophisticated framework in explaining whether and how a firm’s CSP might be affected by 
external conditions. Finally, the results of this research have implications for practitioners. 
As managers’ understanding of stakeholder expectations for CSP increases, they should be in 
a better position to address those concerns and respond effectively (e.g., Oliver, 1991).
Theoretical Framework
The idea that legitimacy is essential for organizations is not new. Legitimacy is a phenom-
enon that constrains change and pressures organizations to conform to their institutional 
environments. For example, firms in a postindustrial society are required to reflect the nature 
of their environments much more so than the technical issues of their specific tasks (Bell, 
1973). The more firms attend to these institutional elements, the more likely they are to be 
seen as conforming to societal norms, that is, being legitimate. Suchman (1995) defined 
legitimacy consistent with these ideas as
A generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions 
(p. 574) . . . Thus, constituents are likely to accord legitimacy to those organizations that “have 
our best interests at heart,” that “share our values,” or that are “honest,” “trustworthy,” “decent,” 
and “wise.” (p. 578)
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) used the term isomorphism to describe the set of legiti-
macy-seeking behaviors where organizations seek increased similarity. The three types of 
isomorphism are coercive isomorphism (organizations adopt structures or procedures 
because they are forced to do so by law, contracts, etc.), normative isomorphism (organiza-
tions adopt procedures to gain normative status through the process of professionalization 
and socialization), and mimetic isomorphism (organizations copy another organization as a 
response to uncertainty). In this article, we argue that all of these types of isomorphism can 
be sources of institutional pressure on firms to increase socially responsible behavior. For 
instance, larger factories are often subject to higher levels of environmental regulations, 
which force them to implement more environmental-friendly operational procedures (coer-
cive). In addition, firms are more likely to adopt socially responsible activities (e.g., better 
employee treatment and community relationships, etc.) in order to meet societal expectations 
(normative). Finally, firms facing higher levels of uncertainty or competitive threats might 
try to imitate more successful firms in the market by performing similar socially responsible 
behaviors (mimetic).
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Although the path to legitimization is not clear (Suchman, 1995), it is increasingly apparent 
that while obeying the law is necessary it is not sufficient for firms to be considered legitimate 
(Epstein, 1987). Companies such as Enron and Arthur Anderson are examples where illegal and 
perceived unethical behavior resulted in a loss of legitimacy. In these cases, powerful institu-
tional actors reduced these once highly respected firms to simply shell organizations disposing 
of what assets remained. In addition, profit maximization by itself is not sufficient for legitimi-
zation as Friedman’s (1962) argument would suggest, that is, “there is one and only one social 
responsibility of business—to use its resources . . . to increase its profits” (p. 133). Because 
legitimization is an essential condition for the survival of the firm (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; 
Rao, 1994; Singh, Tucker, & House 1986; Wiley & Zald, 1968; Zucker, 1989), the business 
firm must go beyond legal compliance and single-minded profit maximization because they 
must meet society’s legitimization criteria to be allowed to exist and prosper.
Legitimacy and Corporate Social Performance
“Organizations compete not just for resources and customers but for . . . organizational 
legitimacy, for social as well as economic fitness” (Aldrich, 1979: 265). Such a theoretical 
position elevates legitimacy to the level of a strategic input (e.g., Barney, 1991) and we 
propose that CSP is an important part of the cost of that input (cf. Sethi, 1975). An example 
of how one firm links its social performance to its legitimacy as “license to operate” comes 
from Dow Chemical:
Society, which ultimately holds our license to operate and grow, expects industry to play its part 
in the resolution of these (“social”—authors’ addition) issues. In return, companies that take on 
this challenge can look forward to a better relationship with community neighbors, a boost in 
employee motivation, increased customer loyalty, reduced costs and liabilities and a better cor-
porate reputation. All of which have a direct or indirect influence on a company’s financial 
results. (Dow, 2002)
Although CSP is not sufficient for legitimization, it appears increasingly necessary as part 
of the “license to operate” we mention above. If firms are to prosper they must understand 
what this “license” entails and especially its “fee.” This idea is in line with the conception of 
corporate philanthropy programs that firms may develop and implement as socially responsi-
ble initiatives to achieve synergistic benefits through community connections (i.e., legiti-
macy) in society (Saiia, Carroll, & Buchholtz, 2003). One way that firms gain (pay the “fee” 
for) legitimacy is “by embracing socially accepted techniques” (Suchman, 1995: 580) which 
includes meeting society’s expectations for corporate citizenship through the production of 
“concrete, meritorious outcomes” (Suchman, 1995: 588). A 21st century reality is that meet-
ing these expectations appears to be a moving (rising) target. As societies focus on the future, 
they begin to expect more from corporations as citizens (Reilly, 1990). For evidence of these 
rising expectations, we review the results of GollinHarris’s (2004: 2) stratified national sur-
vey of over 2,700 people in the United States concerning perceptions of corporate citizen-
ship, which stated in part
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44% of Americans . . . have doubts and concerns about the trajectory of the business commu-
nity’s commitment to corporate citizenship, compared to less than one-quarter (24%) who 
believe business is heading in the right direction . . . As business does better at the bottom line, 
Americans are expecting that brands do better at meeting and exceeding their corporate citizen-
ship obligations.
Furthermore, 52% report “they are very or somewhat likely to start or increase their business 
with a company specifically because of its corporate citizenship record” (GollinHarris, 2004: 
3). This number jumped from 43% in their 2003 survey; a 9% increase.
However, even within organizational fields, firms differ in how much CSP will be expected 
of them (Matten & Moon, 2008). The organizational fields (Scott & Meyer, 1983) within 
which firms operate differ in terms of the demands for CSP they place on member firms 
because the different fields have differing legitimacy requirements (Matten & Moon, 2008). 
Cottrill (1990) showed that the nature of specific industries predicts firms’ levels of CSP. 
This article in part extends that line of research. However, Cottrill (1990) only looked at the 
effects of what broadly could be called an industry’s market structure. We argue that our 
understanding of the external effects on CSP is still incomplete. To capture the influence of 
organizational fields (industries) on CSP more effectively, we must consider institutional 
forces as well as market structures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Such varied legitimacy require-
ments may also stem from the different patterns of stakeholders in each field and the different 
criteria for awarding legitimacy these stakeholders have. As such, we propose that the effects 
of all of these mechanisms on legitimacy vary in part depending on how visible a firm is to 
its stakeholders or an industry is to the public. In this article, we develop a model that helps 
us understand how industries and firms within industries vary in terms of the visibility they 
engender and the subsequent required levels of CSP firms choose to exhibit as legitimacy-
seeking behavior.
Hypotheses
Before we present the specific predictions underlying this research, it is necessary that we 
clarify our working definition of CSP. Following McWilliams and Siegel (2000) and Wood 
(1991a), we define CSP as a firm’s actions in the promotion and configuration of social 
responsibility processes, policies, programs, and observable outcomes that are beyond the 
immediate interests of the firm and beyond that which is required by law. Key to this defini-
tion is that CSP is about both values and outcomes, that is, the firm’s beliefs are not 
sufficient—rather the “bottom line” is its social performance, including action areas such as 
diversity programs, corporate philanthropy, and community engagement. To develop a legit-
imacy-based model of the antecedents of CSP, we identified three key sources of direct or 
indirect attention generation, including the nature of the firm’s industry, its visibility to mul-
tiple stakeholders, and its level of slack resources. Below, we analyze how these different 
types of visibility sources affect managers’ choices regarding their firms’ levels of CSP. We 
also examine the effect of firms’ financial performance on the relationship between firm vis-
ibility and subsequent CSP.
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Industry Visibility
The most basic issue in predicting how much legitimacy-seeking CSP firms will achieve 
likely depends on the characteristics of their area of business activity. Firms’ stakeholders 
(e.g., customers, suppliers, regulators, and media) have expectations that vary systemati-
cally across organizational fields (Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991). That is, the context in which 
firms operate has a profound influence in shaping societal expectations of legitimate corpo-
rate behavior (Miles, 1987). In general, firms that operate in more visible industries are more 
likely to face stronger institutional pressure than those in less visible industries. The visibil-
ity of an industry stems from, for example, (a) the level of environmental, financial or pro-
duction risks in which an industry might entail and (b) the level of customers, employment, 
revenues, or taxes an industry generates. Organizations that operate in what appear to be 
more risky industries receive greater scrutiny from institutional actors and are expected to 
demonstrate higher levels of commitment to socially responsible behaviors. This is in line 
with Gardberg and Fombrun’s (2006) argument that industry visibility shapes the range of 
acceptable corporate citizenship profiles. As examples; nuclear power plants are highly vis-
ible because of the potential danger from accidents. Consumer product manufacturers 
receive more scrutiny because they have more customers than do business-to-business mar-
keters. Of consumer oriented firms, gasoline retailers are more visible than trash-haulers 
because their services pervade our consciousness more. Moreover, pharmaceutical firms 
often have several community groups closely monitoring their activities while few people 
pay attention to soft-drink distributors. As such, we posit that the choice of how much CSP 
a firm exhibits is influenced by the degree of visibility in the institutional environment of the 
industry in which the firm participates.
Hypothesis 1: A firm’s industry visibility is positively associated with its CSP.
Visibility to Multiple Stakeholders
Our second predictor is the firm’s visibility to multiple stakeholders. Stakeholders are pro-
viders of legitimacy but they can just as easily withdraw it. Various types of stakeholders place 
different CSP demands on the firm and vary in the extent to which they care about CSP (Mackey, 
Mackey, & Barney, 2007). The more that important stakeholders actively agitate for CSP, the 
more likely it is to occur (J. L. Campbell, 2007). Increasingly, activist stockholders use share-
holder initiatives to pressure firms to increase specific CSP activities. Community groups use 
tactics ranging from letter-writing campaigns to boycotts to address perceived CSP deficien-
cies. We argue that firms that are more visible to a higher number of stakeholder groups are 
more likely to allocate internal resources to CSP than firms who face a lower number of stake-
holder groups. Further, firms that have higher media exposure (more news coverage) are under 
greater scrutiny concerning their corporate citizenship behaviors because of their higher visibil-
ity, which in turn helps reduce information asymmetry between stakeholders and managers 
(Brammer & Millington, 2006). A decrease in information asymmetry gives stakeholders a 
clearer picture of the firm’s actions, which may in turn increase stakeholders’ future 
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expectations. These increased expectations may motivate the firm’s managers to perform more 
CSP in order to address the pressures from institutional actors and other important stakeholders. 
This argument is consistent with Saiia et al. (2003) who found that firms with higher visibility 
are more inclined to make larger philanthropic gifts to the community. In addition, firms vary 
greatly in terms of how many actors (e.g., number of common shareholders, institutional inves-
tors, and community groups) might have a stake in their outcomes. Organizations with a large 
number of common shareholders are likely to be more visible than those with a small number 
of shareholders. The more that the firm’s actions are monitored by stakeholders, the more likely 
their social performance is explicit and visible (J. L. Campbell, 2007; Matten & Moon, 2008).
Alternatively, stakeholder demands for CSP may be explained from the resource-based 
view perspective (RBV). RBV scholars (e.g., Barney, 1991) argue that resources that are 
valuable, rare, nonimitable, or nonsubstitutable by competitors can be sources of competitive 
advantages for organizations. Investing in CSP may help the firm develop new competencies 
and resources in areas such as human capital, corporate culture, and technology (Barney, 
1991; Russo & Fouts, 1997; Wernerfelt, 1984), which should lead to shareholder wealth in 
the long run. More importantly, corporate reputation is linked directly to social responsibility 
(Fombrun, 1996). Godfrey (2005) argued that philanthropy and other corporate social initia-
tives create intangible assets for the firm by generating positive “moral capital” among com-
munities and stakeholders. Such positive moral capital is a resource and provides the firm 
with insurance-like protection, which can help mitigate stakeholders’ propensities for nega-
tive actions against the firm when bad acts occur. A higher level of moral capital from engag-
ing in a higher level of CSP serves two purposes. First, it allows a firm to increase its 
legitimacy among stakeholders with which it interacts. Second, like reputational capital 
(e.g., Deephouse 2000; Fombrun, Gardberg, & Barnet, 2000), moral capital can become a 
sustainable competitive advantage to a firm because it often takes a number of years to 
develop (Dierickx & Cool, 1989); therefore it is difficult to imitate or substitute (Barney, 
1991; Ghemawat, 1991). In sum, we argue that as firms’ visibility to stakeholders increases, 
they will (a) face more CSP demands from the institutional and other actors and (b) have 
greater incentives to create, develop, and maintain positive moral capital with their stake-
holders, both resulting in higher levels of CSP.
Hypothesis 2: A firm’s visibility to stakeholders is positively associated with its CSP.
Financial Performance as a Moderator
The relationship between CSP and financial performance has received a considerable 
amount of attention (e.g., Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003). The main concern in this litera-
ture lies in whether there is a trade-off between socially responsible behavior and profitability. 
However, results from past research have been mixed, reporting positive, negative, and null 
relationships between CSP and firm performance (e.g., see Aupperle et al., 1985; Waddock & 
Graves, 1997). Although the mixed findings can be explained by the type of dependent vari-
ables, stakeholder mismatching, measurement errors, and a neglect of various contingency 
factors (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Wu, 2006), some scholars (e.g., Sharfman, 2005) suggested that 
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the CSP/financial performance relationship may be moderated or mediated by other factors. In 
this research, instead of proposing a direct effect on CSP from firm profitability, we examine 
the moderating role of economic performance in the relationship between the firm’s visibility 
to stakeholders and CSP (Figure 1).
Earlier we argued that organizations with higher visibility (e.g., greater media exposure, a 
large number of stakeholders, etc.) are more sensitive to stakeholders’ demands for CSP because 
they are under greater scrutiny in the range and quality of their corporate citizenship profiles. 
The relationship between visibility to stakeholders and CSP is likely moderated by a firm’s 
financial performance because higher profits should give stakeholders more confidence in the 
firm’s ability to make CSP investments. Stakeholders who value CSP might put pressure on the 
firm to facilitate the implementation of social actions (Mackey et al., 2007); such demands 
should be higher when the firm has capabilities to allocate funds from its profits for CSP.
We propose that economic performance will moderate the relationship between firm visibil-
ity and CSP because organizations with strong profitability may not necessarily exhibit higher 
levels of CSP, unless they have incentives (e.g., face visibility pressure from institutional stake-
holders) to provide benefits or to pay the legitimacy “license fee” to society. While visibility to 
multiple stakeholders is a key driver behind a firm’s CSP, high visibility plus strong profit 
performance accentuates pressures that key stakeholders put on firms to demonstrate more 
socially responsible behaviors. Accordingly, the relationship between visibility to stakeholders 
and CSP should be enhanced when the firm has strong economic performance. This argument 
is important because the central theme of our research is to examine whether an instrumental 
choice (i.e., visibility that forces profitable firms to perform more CSP) plays a critical role in 
managerial decisions regarding the level of CSP firms make.
Hypothesis 3: Economic performance moderates the relationship between a firm’s visibility to 
stakeholders and its CSP, such that higher profits will strengthen the relationship between a 
firm’s visibility to stakeholders and its CSP.
Corporate Social Performance
Visibility to Multiple
Stakeholders
Economic Performance
Industry Visibility
Slack Visibility
H4
H3H2
H1
+
+
+
+
Figure 1
Conceptual Model: Visibility, Economic Performance, and Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP)
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Organizational Slack, Visibility, and Corporate Social Performance
The next predictor of CSP is organizational slack (e.g., Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, & Tansik, 
1988). Organizational slack can be manifested in several forms, such as excess staff, retained 
earnings, or discretionary budgets (Tan, 2003). Because CSP activities rely on firms’ alloca-
tion of resources to meet both social and economic objectives, firms with more slack are more 
likely to implement more CSP activities than firms with little or no slack. Cyert and March 
(1963) argued that firm policies and expenditures are especially sensitive to the existence of 
slack resources. If CSP entails a significant cost, firms with more slack are more capable of 
absorbing those costs and more willing to undertake socially responsible actions (J. L. Camp-
bell, 2007; Parket & Eilbirt, 1975; Seifert, Morris, & Bartkus 2004; Ullmann, 1985). This 
position is consistent with the Waddock and Graves (1997: 314) “virtuous cycle” argument 
that when firms engage in CSP they generate better economic returns which subsequently 
allow firms to afford more investments in future CSP especially when these resources are 
retained as slack. In addition, previous studies (e.g., Bowen & Sharma, 2005; Sharma, 2000) 
also showed that organizational slack can facilitate proactive corporate environmental strate-
gies that many consider CSP as well. For example, available slack (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983) 
in the form of excess management time or cash give firms greater flexibility in experimenting 
with different socially responsive projects. Furthermore, conceptualizing slack through the 
cost of capital perspective, Sharfman (2005) found that the relationship between CSP and firm 
financial performance is mediated over time by the firm’s level of slack resources. This sug-
gests that lower costs of capital as a result of increased CSP can function as unabsorbed slack 
(Singh, 1986) to support other investments such as social performance projects.
However, although profits may generate the visibility, the firm’s ability or willingness to 
invest in CSP is a function of how much of those profits are turned into organizational slack 
(Sharfman et al., 1988). Specifically, although high profits create the potential for more slack 
resources, firms may reinvest such profits in the firm’s core activities rather than leaving 
them as discretionary slack (i.e., unallocated resources that are not dedicated to the produc-
tion function of the firm in the short term; Bowen & Sharma, 2005). The presence of slack 
resources allows the firm to make more discretionary (visible) investments, for example, 
ones that are higher risk or that have lower potential return (e.g. Sharfman et al., 1988). Such 
investments are often highly visible to stakeholders and media. Consistent with our argu-
ment, Easley and O’Hara (2004) found that firms with lower costs of capital (i.e., more slack 
resources) engaged in more corporate disclosures generally. As slack (discretionary resource) 
levels increase, because of social contract–based ideas, organizations are expected to fulfill 
their obligations to society by putting something back into the community via CSP. To this 
point, Seifert et al. (2004) found that high slack resources lead to higher corporate philan-
thropy—again actions that are highly visible to stakeholders. Although the presence of slack 
allows the firm to engage in more CSP (generating visibility) it is also associated with more 
visibility generally (Easley & O’Hara, 2004). Therefore, for the above reasons we posit that 
visibility from organizational slack is associated with higher levels of CSP.
Hypothesis 4: The higher the firm’s visibility from organizational slack, the higher the level of CSP.
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Method
Data and Sample
We collected the data for the present study archivally from a variety of databases. Carroll 
(1991) encouraged researchers to measure CSP from a variety of different perspectives using 
a variety of different measures. Whereas in narrative discussions, CSP has been characterized 
as if it were unidimensional, the literature seems clear that it is multidimensional (e.g., Boal 
& Peery, 1985; Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Mattingly & Berman, 2006; McWilliams & Siegel, 
2000; Mears & Smith 1977; Wood 1991b; Wood & Jones, 1995). Among the approaches to 
examining CSP in terms of a single issue are CSP as pollution control (e.g., Bowman & 
Haire, 1975; Chen & Metcalf, 1980; Folger & Nutt, 1975) or as corporate philanthropy 
(e.g., Buchholtz et al., 1999; Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991; Wang & Coffey, 1992). Others 
have examined the opposite of CSP (i.e., corporate crime; e.g., Wokutch & Spencer, 1987). 
Alternative approaches include the use of Fortune magazine’s America’s Most Admired 
Companies data (e.g., McGuire, Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 1988; Spencer & Taylor, 1987), 
primary surveys (e.g., Aupperle, 1984), content analysis of annual reports (e.g., Wolfe, 1991), 
or the Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (KLD) social performance indicators (e.g., Berman, 
Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999; Guerard, 1997; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Waddock & 
Graves, 1997). Each of these approaches has attempted to measure the CSP construct in dif-
ferent ways. Although there have been a wide variety of methods used to measure this elusive 
construct, (Bowman & Haire, 1975; Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991; Mattingly & Berman, 2006, 
etc.), Graves and Waddock (1994) suggested that the KLD data offer several advantages over 
other CSP measurement approaches, including comprehensiveness and objectivity, so we 
used the data set.
Because scholars have called for the use of multiple sources of data in measuring CSP 
(Carroll, 1994; Graves & Waddock, 1994), in this research we augmented the KLD measures 
with the Social Responsibility score from Fortune magazine’s survey of America’s Most 
Admired Companies. Fortune Magazine annually surveys thousands of executives concern-
ing seven reputation elements, including social responsibility. The KLD data set has been 
widely used in CSP research (e.g., Berman et al., 1999; Guerard, 1997; Johnson & Greening, 
1999; Waddock & Graves, 1997) as has the Fortune magazine data (e.g., Brown & Perry, 
1994; Conine & Madden, 1987). We chose evaluations performed by external observers 
(KLD and the participants in the Fortune survey) for several reasons. Both of these databases 
are large and address cross-sections of industries so we are more likely to have sufficient 
variance for all variables. In addition, there is less chance for self-serving biases from which 
primary data might suffer because the executives (in the Fortune survey) or the raters (who 
work for KLD) are not evaluating their own firms’ performance. Also, firm-specific choices 
such as philanthropy or environmental performance are too narrow to capture the broad 
nature of the CSP construct. We discuss the measures using these data sets in the next section. 
Of the 500 firms in the original Standard & Poor (S&P) data set, 159 firms were evaluated 
both by KLD and the Fortune survey. Missing or incomplete data further reduced the final 
sample size to 124 firms.
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Measures of Corporate Social Performance
For construct validity purposes, we combined the KLD CSP indicators with the Fortune 
magazine Social Responsibility score. Combining the KLD scores with the Fortune data 
provides this study with two different, objective evaluations of CSP and allows triangulation 
on the construct as well as a demonstration of convergent validity (D. T. Campbell & Fiske, 
1959). We used data from 2002 as that was the latest complete year for all data available at 
the beginning of this analysis.
KLD’s Socrates database (http://www.kld.com/research/socrates/index.html) was devel-
oped for commercial use to help investors determine the degree to which firms were socially 
responsible plus as tools for KLD’s own use in its screened mutual funds and indices. The 
KLD data set consists of scores for each firm on seven different “social” screens: (a) commu-
nity, (b) corporate governance, (c) diversity, (d) employee relations, (e) environment, (f) 
human rights, and (g) product (KLD, 2007). In addition, the firm evaluates each company on 
a varying number of “controversial business issue” screens. Currently, these additional screens 
are alcohol, adult entertainment, gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power, and tobacco 
(KLD, 2007), whereas previously firms had been evaluated on investments in South Africa 
and Burma (Myanmar) among other things. However, using all 14 indicators is unwieldy so it 
was necessary to develop a more parsimonious approach. First, one sees that for the seven 
KLD “controversial business issue” screens scores only 1% to 5% of the firms had a nonzero 
score on these measures. Such a highly skewed distribution would bias any results obtained 
and there is no way to transform the data so that it would not. Because so few firms were 
evaluated in each of these areas, we eliminated these indicators (see Mattingly & Berman, 
2006). After the deletions, the KLD data set contained the seven “social” indicators: commu-
nity involvement, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human 
rights, and products. Although this set is more parsimonious, it still represents a broad range 
of CSP issues that firms face. For each criterion, KLD identifies whether the firm has a 
“strength” or a “concern” in three to seven subareas. Each subarea then receives a score of 0 
or 1. In past literature (e.g., Sharfman, 1996), authors subtracted each area’s average concern 
score from its average strength score. The potential problem with this approach is that one 
cannot assume strengths and weaknesses are equivalent. McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd (2003) 
found that empirical results based on CSP strengths and concerns have been significantly 
inconsistent, indicating that they are subject to different dynamics. Because combining the 
strength and concern scores in the KLD data is argued to be less valid (Mattingly & Berman, 
2006), we calculated the KLD strength scores in each category separately to remove this con-
cern. Consistent with past research (e.g., McGuire et al., 2003), we created an average strength 
score for each firm in each area by summing the scores for each subarea and dividing by the 
number of subareas.
Despite several advantages it offers in measuring CSP, the KLD database has some limi-
tations. One primary criticism about using the KLD data set is its weighting scheme for the 
different dimensions of CSP (Graves & Waddock, 1994). The equal weighting is an arbi-
trary choice and treats all dimensions as equally important. Sharfman and Hart (2007) 
reviewed the concurrent validity of the version of the KLD data used in this study and it 
demonstrated sufficient convergence with a new continuous version of the data that have 
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better reliability so as to satisfy validity concerns about the data set. Another concern for 
using the KLD data set is that it might mask unique industry effects and actual social per-
formance when using multi-industry samples because certain dimensions in CSP are 
expected to be closely related to the specific stakeholder demands and context in each 
industry (Griffin & Mahon, 1997). To tackle this problem, we examined whether firms in 
different industries differed systematically in their levels of CSP without taking into consid-
eration industry visibility, which we will explain in more details below. As Mattingly and 
Berman (2006) point out that the KLD data, although imperfect, can be useful for the accu-
mulation of knowledge, we chose to use the dataset because of its comprehensiveness and 
objectivity over other CSP measures (Graves & Waddock, 1994).
The Fortune magazine data come from their annual survey of “America’s Most Admired 
Companies.” This survey examines the largest firms in 64 different industries on seven dif-
ferent dimensions. The survey, conducted by the Hay Group for Fortune gathers data from 
“a total of 15,000 respondents (executives, directors, and veteran securities analysts) around 
the world—10,000 in the U.S. and the rest in 21 other countries . . . (they) asked U.S. execu-
tives to rate the largest companies in their industry sectors in (seven) key categories” (Useem, 
2005: 66).
However, the Fortune ratings have received a number of criticisms regarding their useful-
ness in CSP research (e.g., Carroll, 1991; Fryxell & Wang 1994; Wokutch & McKinney, 
1991; Wokutch & Spencer, 1987; Wood, 1995), such as their correlation with firm profitabil-
ity (i.e., a financial “halo” effect—Brown & Perry, 1994), the grand aggregation approach in 
measuring corporate reputation, and the focus on a particular stakeholder group (other execu-
tives in the same industry; e.g., Wood, 1995). Although some questions have been raised about 
the use of the Fortune data in CSP research, “this database holds substantial promise as a 
powerful instrument in reputation, and CSP research,” (Szwajkowski & Figlewicz, 1999: 387) 
particularly when used in conjunction with other measures. Using just the Social Responsibility 
score to triangulate with the KLD data would seem to limit those problems. Note that 
Szwajkowski and Figlewicz (1997) took issue with whether such a halo even existed given 
the evidence for the link between social and financial performance (e.g., Orlitzky et al., 2003) 
as well as effectively addressing the other concerns (e.g., demand characteristics, comparing 
reputation vs. CSP, etc.) about the use of the Fortune data set.
However, using this still large set of indicators begs the question as to whether there are 
latent CSP constructs. Because the KLD data can be useful in indicating specific aspects of 
CSP based on identified taxonomies (Mattingly & Berman, 2006), we performed an explor-
atory factor analysis (EFA) on the items in a manner consistent with Johnson and Greening 
(1999) or Waldman, Siegel, and Javidan (2006). We did not use the factor structure in either 
previous study because KLD changed the scoring process for evaluating firms in the interim 
between the data years that Johnson and Greening (1999) or Waldman et al. (2006) used and 
that which we use in this project. Using an oblimin rotation (which does not force orthogo-
nality); we conducted an analysis on the strengths scores plus the Fortune Social 
Responsibility Reputation (FSRR) score. We used standard scores in this analysis because 
the FSRR score and the KLD averages are on different metrics. Our criteria for selecting a 
factor were that the eigenvalue was greater than 1.0, that the items on the factor loaded more 
than .50 and did not cross-load more than .50 with any other factor. Using these criteria in 
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the strengths/FSRR analysis, we were able to extract three factors that accounted for 56% 
of the variance in the data set. Table 1 shows the factor structure matrix of our CSP scales. 
The first factor, which we dubbed Social CSP Strengths, contains KLD strength indicators 
in diversity, environment, community and the FSRR (a = .61). We selected this title because 
the indicators in the first dimension seem to clearly relate to a firm’s concern for social 
issues.
The second factor contains employee relations and product quality indicators, which 
appear to highlight a firm’s efforts in building competitive competence; thus, we name it 
“Strategic CSP Strengths (a = not applicable). Although it is mathematically possible to 
calculate an alpha for a two-item scale as we have in our Strategic CSP Strengths indicator, 
such results are prone to error. The correlation (r = .33, p < .001) between both items demon-
strates a reasonable degree of reliability (convergence) because our research used a large, 
diverse set of CSP indicators that did not intend to measure the same general construct when 
they were created in the KLD Socrates database. Mitchell and Jolley (2007) suggest that a 
median interitem correlation of .30 usually indicates good internal consistency. We could 
drop the second CSP indicator that was derived from our EFA procedure because the first 
factor has twice more of explanatory power in the variance. However, this would substan-
tially limit the overall contribution and generalizability of our results because using only the 
Social CSP indicator would be too narrow to subsume the variety of CSP dimensions. We 
dropped the third factor from the analysis because it was represented by a single indicator, 
corporate governance. Because Social CSP strengths and Strategic CSP strengths each cap-
ture different aspects of socially responsive activities by firms, we believe that it is necessary 
to test our hypotheses on both dimensions in order to understand the relationship between 
firm visibility pressure and subsequent firm CSP more effectively.
Please note that although it might have been preferable to complete a confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) on our CSP indicators, we did not have a sufficient sample size (Jackson, 
2005) to generate a confirmatory structure in which we could have confidence. Jackson 
(2005) suggests that smaller sample sizes like we have in this study have the same 
Table 1
Rotated Factor Structure Matrix of the Corporate Social Performance (CSP) Items
 Social CSP Strength Strategic CSP Strength Factor 3
Diversity .73 .34 -.09
Employee relationships .25 .83 -.16
Environment .51 .29 -.07
Human .49 .38 .15
Product quality .26 .74 .02
Community .77 -.07 -.03
Governance -.10 −.08 .94
Fortune social score .60 .27 -.39
Note: Extraction method: principal component analysis with oblimin rotation. Item selection criteria: factor loaded 
>.5 and no cross loading. These three factors (social strength, strategic CSP strength, and factor 3) account for 
56% of the common variance.
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deleterious effects in CFA on fit statistics and parameter estimates as one sees in structural 
equations modeling (see our discussion below). Therefore we determined that although 
exploratory factor analysis has its limitations, we can have more confidence in the results 
of an EFA than we would in a CFA.
Independent Variables
Industry visibility. To estimate industry visibility, we used three-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes as the search terms in the FirstSearch and Business & Company 
Resource Center news databases. Both databases provide comprehensive coverage on key 
events related to companies, industries, and markets. We averaged the total number of news 
reports for each SIC code from both news databases over the period 1999-2001. We ended 
with 1 year lagged from our dependent variable (i.e., CSP) to rule out a potential alternative 
explanation of the proposed causal relationships because of an endogeneity problem.
Visibility to stakeholders. It is tautological to suggest that firms face a wide array of 
stakeholders. To capture this range we used several disparate indicators to estimate the extent 
to which firm has visibility to this wide range of stakeholders specifically: (a) the number of 
firm employees over the period 1999-2001; (b) the number of CSP-oriented shareholder 
resolutions during the period 1999-2001 as reported by the Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility (because shareholder resolutions are the result of increased stakeholder 
awareness and also can stimulate media attention; O’Rourke, 2003); (c) the number of pub-
lic affairs personnel per firm during 1999-2001 from the Directory of Corporate Public 
Affairs (because more public affairs personnel are both likely to increase the firm’s visibility 
to stakeholders as well as be a response to high levels of stakeholder attention; Marcus & 
Irion, 1987); (d) the number of common shareholders; (e) the number of shares held by 
institutional investors (both items d and e were gathered from S&P’s Research Insight 
Database); (f) the number of news mentions the firm received from 1999-2001 in the Lexis-
Nexis plus the FirstSearch and Business and Industry news databases. We ended with 1 year 
lagged data because visibility in period t might not be felt until later (t+1) when relevant 
stakeholders have had a chance to digest the visibility information. We then conducted an 
exploratory factor analysis with the same selection criteria as our CSP measures. The test 
extracted one single factor with all six variables included, which accounted for 49% of the 
total variance in the data set (a = .78). Such a high alpha indicates that our measure of the 
visibility to stakeholders construct has strong internal consistency and convergent validity.
Organizational slack as indicated by costs of capital. We used weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) as our indicator of organizational slack. WACC is an appropriate conceptu-
alization of slack resources because it represents a more comprehensive estimate of discre-
tionary, company-wide resource availability than the more commonly used accounting-based 
approaches (e.g., Tan, 2003) that focus on narrow indicators of actual or potential discretion-
ary resources (e.g., the debt/equity, quick or return on assets [ROA] ratios). More important, 
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WACC is an important determinant of firm valuation because the lower the cost of capital, 
the lower the rate of return demanded by a firm’s investors for the capital they provide to the 
firm, which in turn makes it less costly for a firm to engage in CSP because it puts less pres-
sure on the organization’s overall resource base. In the general case of a firm with both 
equity and debt financing, the firm’s after-tax weighted average cost of capital (rWACC) 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1958) can be expressed as
 
rWACC ¼ E
Dþ E
 
rE þ D
Dþ E
 
rDð1 TÞ,
 (1)
where E = market value of the firm’s equity, D = market value of the firm’s debt, rE = the 
firm’s cost of equity capital, rD = the firm’s cost of debt capital, and T = the firm’s rate of 
corporate taxation.
The firm’s cost of equity capital (rE) is equal to the expected investor return from holding 
the firm’s equity, from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM; Littner, 1965; Sharpe, 1964)
 rE = rF + bE (rM - rF), (2)
where rF = the risk-free rate, rM = the return on the market portfolio (risk premium), and 
bE ¼
CovðrE, rMÞ
VarðrMÞ measures the firm’s systematic risk.
The cost of equity capital is found using the CAPM (Littner, 1965; Sharpe, 1964), which 
equates the cost of equity of a firm to the risk-free interest rate plus the firm’s beta times the 
market risk premium. The risk-free rate (rF) is the return an investor can earn on an essen-
tially risk-free investment. Following convention for our risk-free rate, we used the 10-year 
U.S. Treasury Bond rate of 4.79% which was the rate at the beginning of this analysis. Beta 
(b) is the covariance of the market’s return with the individual company’s common stock 
return divided by the market’s variance. We used an annual beta computed by Research 
Insight for each company from the COMPUSTAT database. The weight of equity (rE) is 
found by using the total market capitalization, divided by debt plus market capitalization. 
Market capitalization is the product of the value of one share of stock times the number of 
shares outstanding. The weight of debt (rD) is found by summing all debt issues of the firm, 
divided by the total of that debt plus market capitalization. The tax rate data came from the 
Bloomberg Financial database. We set the return on the market portfolio (risk premium; rM) 
at 5.6% based on the Fama and French’s (2002) estimate of average returns over the period 
1872-2000. We examined whether any effect of these slack resources was immediate or 
lagged. We determined that there was no lagged effect so we used current period (2002) data. 
It should be noted that a WACC estimate done with a firm specific risk premium from the 
Bloomberg database correlated with our estimate at .96, so we used the estimate based on the 
Fama and French (2002) average to be more consistent with previous finance literature.
Financial performance. We used market-based performance estimated by total returns 
(capital gains plus any dividends for the target year) from COMPUSTAT to examine 
whether economic performance moderates the relationship of visibility to multiple stake-
holders and a firm’s CSP. Unlike accounting-based performance, which generally highlights 
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the internal efficiency of a firm (e.g., Cochran & Wood, 1984), market-based returns 
capture the external responses to organizational actions, thus mainly reflect the shareholder 
satisfaction on firm’s past, current, or future stock returns and risk (Cochran & Wood, 
1984). Because this research focuses on how visibility pressure from the institutional envi-
ronment influences managerial decisions regarding CSP efforts, a market-based finance 
measure (e.g., total returns) seems more appropriate. Because single years of firm financial 
data might be sensitive to changes in the external environment or noneconomic factors (e.g., 
terrorist threats), we averaged the three year (1999-2001) total returns of each firm to 
increase the stability of this financial measure.
Also, in this study, we employed a number of variables to isolate their unique contribu-
tions in the proposed relationships. First, we controlled for size because it might influence 
managers’ perceptions of visibility pressure from the society. Because there is little agree-
ment as to the best measure for firm size (Kimberly, 1976), we combined three indicators 
(i.e., total assets, total sales, and total equity) to capture both financial- and market-based size 
measures. These data were extracted from COMPUSTAT over the period 1999-2001 as the 
lagged data again proved necessary. All three indicators for the firm size were log trans-
formed to obtain a more normal distribution. We then conducted a factor analysis using the 
same factor selection criteria as we mentioned above. The test extracted one factor that 
accounted for 89% of the variance in the dataset (a = .93). We also controlled ROA to avoid 
the potential measurement bias that has been criticized as accounting for the mixed results on 
the relationships between CSP and firm profitability (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Wu, 2006).
Because data come from S&P 500 firms, which are normally more visible than other 
firms, we examined whether there was sufficient amount of variance in our sample. Specifi-
cally, we reviewed the standard deviation (SD), the range, and the kurtosis scores of the 
variables in our model (see Table 2). For example, organizational slack (measured by WACC) 
has an SD of 0.03, a range from 0.02 to 0.19, and a kurtosis score of .17. The industry visibil-
ity variable (measured by news coverage) has an SD of 6,788, a range from 0 to 32,106, and 
a kurtosis score of 0.519. In general, a kurtosis score that is within the range of ±2.00 indi-
cates a broad and near enough to a normal distribution (Field, 2005) to not introduce error 
into analyses. Although there is no formula for determining what defines sufficient variance, 
the results suggest that our data items have broad distributions, which should help reduce the 
concern for potential range restriction problems.
Additionally, we examined whether there was a need to control for industry membership 
in our research. Any industry membership effect is not the same as industry-level visibility, 
which we examine as one of the main predictors for CSP in our analysis. The investigation 
of the industry membership effect on CSP can shed light on whether firms in different indus-
tries differ systematically in their levels of CSP without taking into consideration industry 
visibility. If there is difference in CSP by industry membership, then the inclusion of such an 
effect is necessary. A common way to control any industry effect is using dummy variables 
for SIC codes; however, this approach is not practical in this research because there are 38 
industries based on two-digit SIC codes in our dataset. Although scholars (e.g., Amburgey & 
Miner, 1992) have suggested a variety of methods to deal with a large number of industry 
codes, we are concerned that any alterations from the original SIC distribution might open 
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the door to alternative explanations of any results. As such, we performed the Kruskal–Wallis 
analysis of variance test, a robust method that allows for comparisons within nonparametric 
data, using two-digit SIC codes as the grouping variable and firm CSP as the test variable. 
The result of this analysis was not significant; indicating that there is no effect of industry 
membership on CSP in our data set and that there was no need to control for it.
We used hierarchical regression analysis to test the hypotheses in this study because this 
method allows us to examine whether and how much each additional theoretical predictor 
influences our ability to explain a firm’s CSP. Some might argue that structural equations 
modeling (SEM) might have provided a more rigorous test of the models. However, using 
SEM was not appropriate in this research for two reasons. First, our sample size was too 
small to allow for robust estimations of either a measurement or a structural model. Previous 
work suggests that sample sizes such as ours are often subject to false positives and poor fit 
(Bentler & Chou, 1987). Second, we were interested in the marginal contribution of interac-
tion terms over any variance explained by the main effects, so hierarchical regression was 
more appropriate as SEM will not handle moderators effectively (Bentler & Chou, 1987). To 
test Hypotheses 1 to 4, we created three models for both CSP strength dimensions (i.e., Social 
CSP Strengths and Strategic CSP Strengths). The first was a control model in which we only 
included ROA, size, and return on assets. The second model examined the main effects (i.e., 
visibility to stakeholders, slack visibility, and industry visibility) for our study. The third 
model tested the moderator effect of firm total returns on the relationship between firm vis-
ibility to stakeholders and subsequent CSP.
Table 2
 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis
  Range Kurtosis Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Social CSPa 4.60 -.42 .02 1.01 1.00       
2 Strategic CSPa 4.27 -.56 .04 1.04 .32** 1.00      
3 Industry 32106 .52 3807 6788 .12 .03 1.00      
visibilityb
4 Visibility to 4.79 -.27 .08 1.03 .66** .42** .15 1.00     
stakeholdersb
5 Slack visibility .17 .17 .08 .03 -.21* .19* -.01 -.15 1.00    
(WACC)a,c
6 Total returnsb .10 2.9 .07 .06 -.10 .01 .01 -.17 .12 1.00  
7 ROAb .31 .94 .05 .04 -.05 .03 .13 .01 -.08 .01 1.00 
8 Firm sizeb 4.8 .12 .01 1.0 -.08 .06 -.06 -.07 .09 .07 .07 1.00
Note: CSP = corporate social performance; WACC = weighted average costs of capital. ROA = return on assets. 
Lagged data were used to test the causal relationships.
a. 2002 data.
b. Average data over 1999-2001.
c. The lower the WACC, the higher the firm’s resource availability and valuation (e.g., more future cash flow).
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Results
Table 2 provides the means, SDs, kurtosis scores, range, and correlations among the vari-
ables. The negative correlation between our slack indicator (WACC) and Social CSP suggests 
a positive relationship between visibility from organizational slack and Social CSP strength 
because a lower WACC implies more slack resources. This infers that more slack is associ-
ated with better performance in the social dimension (i.e., environment, community, and 
diversity). However, we also infer a negative relationship between visibility from organiza-
tional slack and Strategic CSP strength (i.e., employee relations and product quality) because 
the correlation between our slack indicator (WACC) and Strategic CSP is positive, implying 
that Strategic CSP is associated with higher WACC (fewer slack resources). These results 
suggest that the role of slack resources may vary depending on the CSP dimension, which we 
investigate in more detail with hierarchical regressions.
Table 3 presents the hierarchical regression results for Hypotheses 1 to 4 using both Social 
CSP and Strategic CSP strengths. As Table 3 shows, industry visibility is not significantly 
related to either CSP dimension, thus Hypothesis 1 is not supported. Hypothesis 2 proposed 
that the higher the firm’s visibility to stakeholders, the higher the level of CSP. The coeffi-
cients for this variable in Model 3 (full model) on both dimensions are positive and significant 
(p < .01), supporting Hypothesis 2. With respect to Hypothesis 3, our results reveal a negative 
and marginally significant (p < .10) moderator effect of economic performance on the rela-
tionship between a firm’s visibility to stakeholders and Social CSP and no impact on Strategic 
Table 3
Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Firm Visibility and CSP: Hypotheses 1-4
 Social CSP Strategic CSP
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Firm size  -.06 -.03 -.02 .05 .07 .80
ROA -.06 -.07 -.07 .01 .05 .05
Economic performance (RET) -.11 .04 .03 -.01 .06 .05
Industry visibility  .05 .06  -.04 -.04
Visibility to stakeholders  .69** .77**  .48** .56**
Slack visibility(WACC)a  -.14† -.15*  .28** .26**
Visibility to stakeholders ×   -.15†   −.14 
Economic Performance
R2 .03 .47 .48 .02 .26 .28
∆R2  .44 .01  .25 .01
F  .99 4.83*** 13.54*** 0.51 
5.94*** 5.55***
∆F  32.27*** 2.85†  12.98*** 2.32
Note: CSP = corporate social performance; ROA, return on assets; RET = market returns; WACC = weighted 
average costs of capital.
a. Because a lower WACC indicates higher slack visibility, a negative coefficient reflects a positive impact of firm  
slack on the CSP and a positive coefficient reflects a negative impact of firm slack on the CSP. n = 124.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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CSP, indicating that the effect of a firm’s visibility to stakeholders on CSP is not strongly 
influenced by its profit performance. Hypothesis 4 proposed that more visibility from orga-
nizational slack results in higher levels of CSP. The prediction for this hypothesis is that the 
coefficient would be negative because a lower WACC means fewer claims on the firm’s 
resources and hence more slack resources. The coefficient is significant (p < .01) and nega-
tive for Social CSP, but it is positive (p < .01) for Strategic CSP, providing mixed results for 
Hypothesis 4. The R2 for the main effects is .47 on Social CSP and .25 on Strategic CSP. The 
change in the amount of explained variance associated with the addition of the “main effects” 
to Model 1 is statistically significant for both the Social and Strategic CSP equations, dem-
onstrating strong explanatory power for our models.
Discussion
In this research, we intend to clarify complex relationships between stakeholders’ pres-
sures, financial performance, and their effects on CSP. Although our model does not preclude 
ethically motivated CSP, the results from our study strongly suggest that CSP can be concep-
tualized as (at least in part) an instrumental response by managers to legitimacy pressure on 
the firm based on its visibility. Society and its dominant institutions exert coercive, norma-
tive, and mimetic (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) legitimacy pressures on firms in response to 
which some firms increase CSP. Such pressures vary in part as a function of how much vis-
ibility the firm engenders. As we predicted, a positive and significant relationship between 
visibility to stakeholders and the level of CSP emerges from our analyses, indicating that 
Figure 2
Interaction of Economic Performance (RET) and Visibility to Stakeholders on 
Corporate Social Performance (CSP)
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managers become more actively involved in socially responsive projects when they are under 
greater scrutiny by the various stakeholders in the institutional environment.
The interaction of economic performance and visibility to stakeholders is negative and 
marginally significant on the Social CSP dimension and has no effect on the Strategic CSP 
dimension. We examined the relationships using a three-way interaction plot based on the 
Social CSP for further insights. Figure 2 demonstrates that regardless of the level of prof-
itability, organizations generally have lower CSP when they are less visible to stakeholders 
and higher CSP as their visibility to stakeholders increases. In these data, we find more 
consistent effects from visibility to multiple stakeholders than we do for a firm’s financial 
performance in the CSP decisions managers make. Although profits provide firms with 
more flexibility in how they allocate resources for CSP (which we see in the slack results), 
firms with stronger economic performance (as measured by market returns) may not neces-
sarily exhibit higher CSP than less profitable firms. Because economic performance is 
such a broad construct and can be measured in a variety of ways, we conducted a post hoc 
analysis using an accounting-based indicator, ROA, to examine whether it had a different 
moderating effect in the relationship. The results of this additional analysis are consistent 
with those for the market return measure. Overall, this finding is important because it 
unveils linkages between visibility, profitability, and CSP, and provides further insights 
into the mixed results of previous research on profitability and CSP (Margolis & Walsh, 
2001; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Wu, 2006).
We found that although the presence of slack resources has a significant effect on a firm’s 
CSP, such impact is not uniform across CSP dimensions. Our results show that more slack 
leads not only to stronger CSP in areas such as community, environment, and diversity pro-
grams but also lowers strategically related CSP (i.e., employee relations and product quality). 
This finding suggests that managerial decisions in the choice of CSP may be more strongly 
influenced by external factors such as social demands from the community or stakeholder 
groups, rather than by the internal characteristics. An alternative explanation could be that 
while it is difficult to allocate resources for high levels of CSP in all dimensions, managers 
might convert some of the resources from other social programs to those they perceive to be 
more critical in meeting the demands of institutional actors.
Despite the general agreement between the results and the theory, notable differences do 
exist. We found that industry visibility has no direct impact on a firm’s CSP. We wondered if 
the influence of industry visibility on CSP was more indirect. As such, we conducted extra 
tests to examine further any mediation effect by visibility to stakeholders and found that the 
effect of industry visibility on CSP is indeed mediated (indirect) through visibility to stake-
holders. In other words, industry visibility leads to higher visibility to stakeholders, which in 
turns leads to higher levels of CSP. These findings even more strongly suggest that visibility 
to stakeholders is a key driver behind managerial CSP decisions.
If as we argue, visibility generates pressure from institutional and other stakeholders, 
then we can conceptualize an instrumental response to these demands using CSP as an 
Oliver (1991) response to an institutional process. Our argument would suggest that CSP 
is, in general, an acquiescence or compromise-type response where the firm sees the insti-
tutional pressures and uses CSP to address them. Using Oliver’s (1991) terms, such firm 
reactions would range from bargaining with stakeholders to outright compliance. However, 
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depending on the strategy the firm employs through its CSP decisions; such actions could 
be an avoidance response (e.g., using one type of CSP to conceal or escape notice for another 
type of poor social performance), a defiance response (addressing the preferences of one 
stakeholder by not doing what another stakeholder wishes done) or a manipulation response 
where firms attempt (e.g., via “greenwashing,” i.e., appearing environmentally responsive 
when actually not) to co-opt or even deceive key stakeholders. By confirming that at least 
in part CSP is an instrumental response to firm visibility and the attendant institutional pres-
sures, we increase our ability to make finer-grained examinations of the motives managers 
have in making CSP investments and are better able to use the Oliver (1991) typology as a 
guide for investigating these motives in the future.
Limitations
There are some elements of this study that could be perceived as limiting its robustness 
or generalizability. The first concern is the measurement of CSP. Although we were able to 
develop a psychometrically defensible Social CSP measure combining the KLD and For-
tune scores that demonstrated convergent validity as well as a second Strategic CSP scale, 
these measures could be criticized as still being too narrow to subsume the variety of CSP 
dimensions. A second potential limitation of the study is the sample size. Although 124 
firms provide sufficient statistical power to examine our hypotheses, we were constrained 
by the fact that the KLD and Fortune datasets cover very different firm sets. However, this 
sample provides broad coverage across industries to allow generalizability.
One might also be concerned about the internal consistency of the CSP measures. Although 
the alpha statistics for the Social CSP score exceed the Nunnally (1967) threshold of .6 for 
new scales, they are somewhat below current convention for this statistic. In addition, the 
Strategic CSP scale has low but acceptable convergence but a meaningful alpha cannot be 
calculated. We conducted a post hoc analysis on the two items (i.e., product quality and 
employee relations) in the Strategic CSP scale using them individually in separate regres-
sions and found that the results based on the individual indicators are highly consistent with 
those from the combined factor. This test suggests that the effects of the predictors are not 
different when used as single items; thus, using a combined factor derived from the EFA 
procedure allows us to produce a more parsimonious model as well as to triangulate on a 
measure of Strategic CSP. In addition, recent research suggests that the low alpha scores in 
this research may stem from the structure of the version of the KLD data that we used. The 
reader may recall that we use the version of the data where firms are given a “1” or a “0” on 
the subdimensions of the seven “social” indicators. These items are then summed and aver-
aged to create a score for each indicator set. This binary approach to scoring creates some 
range restriction in the interitem variance in each scale potentially lowering the amount of 
interitem correlation needed to generate higher alpha statistics. Sharfman and Hart (2007) 
found that factor scores using the new continuous version of the KLD data had much higher 
alphas (in the .79 to .81 range) overall in part because of the lack of interitem range restric-
tion. The continuous scores in their analysis correlate with their binary equivalents at an 
average of r = .74. Although these other results do not abrogate completely the concern about 
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the internal consistency of our scales, we can have more confidence in our measures that one 
might think because of the binary KLD data’s convergence with the more psychometrically 
powerful continuous version of the data.
Another limitation is that our model does not include noninstrumental predictors (e.g., 
ethical or morally driven motives) of CSP (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2007; Rupp et al., 2006). 
Although our study strongly suggests that CSP can be conceptualized, at least in part, as an 
instrumental response by managers, the question remains how managers’ personal values 
might interact with the firm’s instrumental demands (e.g., legitimacy pressure based on the 
firm’s visibility) to affect their decisions on CSP. As such, research is needed to examine both 
instrumental and non-instrumental motives simultaneously to explore how different types of 
motives interact with each other to influence subsequent CSP.
Finally, although we used lagged data (1-3 years) to rule out alternative explanations of 
the proposed relationships and minimize the endogeneity problem, the use of such variables 
might not completely remove the possibility of reverse causation because factors such as vis-
ibility from organizational slack and CSP may not change dramatically enough within a short 
period of time to abrogate the concern. However, while such a concern can not be ruled out 
completely, the low to nonsignificant correlations among the independent variables limits the 
likelihood of such reverse causation. Please note that it is likely impossible to come up with 
a set of objective and commonly agreed on time lags to examine the causal relationships in 
the CSP research because isolating the potential confounding factors becomes more chal-
lenging as the time lag increases between variables.
Future Research
The results of this study provide guidance for future research. Although we found that 
firms face legitimacy pressures and subsequent institutional/societal demands for CSP as a 
function of their visibility in society, the reverse relationship in which stronger CSP leads to 
higher visibility might also be true. Future research could also examine whether different CSP 
dimensions vary in their impact on the visibility to stakeholders. For example, it is very likely 
that some socially responsive activities might raise higher media interests than others, which 
in turn might draw more attention from stakeholders to those areas. Additionally, while our 
research highlights the role of “visibility” to stakeholders in CSP, it is also apparent that stake-
holders are not uniform in their view of how firms should add value to the society. More 
research is needed to investigate the intricacies of the relationships between stakeholder goals 
and the firm’s CSP. Johnson and Greening (1999) found that the presence of equity invest-
ments from pension funds, but not from mutual funds, was positively related to a firm’s CSP, 
indicating that institutional owners could differ in their attitude toward a firm’s CSP. Also, 
stakeholders’ relationships to management might be critical because individuals or groups that 
have relational ties to firm executives might be more or less effective in monitoring a firm’s 
social performance. Furthermore, because our results are based on large, S&P 500 firms, 
future research also could examine whether these results can be generalized to smaller pub-
licly traded or private firms.
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Implications for Managers
Given that the motives behind managers’ CSP decisions have a great impact on a firm’s 
corporate citizenship behaviors, our results are important for practicing managers. Managers 
of growth stage firms can benefit from this study by better understanding stakeholder expec-
tations for CSP as their organizations become more visible to the society. Instead of passively 
reacting to these institutional pressures, managers can plan ahead to design the most effective 
and efficient strategies to address those concerns proactively before societal demands for 
even more socially responsible actions emerge. However, while accommodating institutional 
expectations and building positive moral capital with a large number of stakeholder groups 
seems critical for any firm’s survival, managers must find ways to allocate resources effi-
ciently while prioritizing their choice of social actions. Our results suggest managers can use 
their CSP choices as a strategic resource that allows firms to address stakeholder demands 
while making the most effective use of CSP as a strategic resource.
Conclusion
This research contributes to the existing literature by systematically examining the role of 
organizational visibility from a variety of sources (i.e., industry visibility, visibility to mul-
tiple stakeholders, and slack visibility) in influencing CSP. Our conceptual framework offers 
important insights regarding the instrumental motives of managers in performing CSP initia-
tives. The results of this study provide strong evidence that when firms are more visible and 
visible in more ways, they engender higher levels of legitimacy pressures that they increas-
ingly often answer by engaging in more socially responsive actions. Although we do not wish 
to preclude values or morality-driven motives (e.g., Rupp et al., in press), our results suggest 
that managers do integrate institutional logics in their choices about CSP, indicating that 
motivations in addition to ethical ones may be at play in the decisions firms make regarding 
CSP. As our knowledge of why managers make the CSP choices develops, we are better able 
to understand the consequences of these actions.
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